How do episodic memory and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children? by Martin-Ordas, Gema et al.
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 08 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00732
How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to
episodic foresight in young children?
Gema Martin-Ordas1*, Cristina M. Atance2 and Julian S. Caza2
1 Cognitive Zoology, Department of Cognitive Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
2 School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Edited by:
Brett Hayes, The University of New
South Wales, Australia
Reviewed by:
Noa Ofen, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, USA
Karl Szpunar, Harvard University, USA
*Correspondence:
Gema Martin-Ordas, Cognitive





Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or
perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory ) or forwards
(i.e., episodic foresight ) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system.
Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in
our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and
foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and ﬁndings suggest that semantic
memory also plays a signiﬁcant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s
deﬁnition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role
in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by
suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both
episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.
Keywords: episodic memory, semantic memory, episodic foresight, children, developmental psychology
INTRODUCTION
The human mind often wanders forward in time to contemplate
what the future might be like (e.g., our next conference talk) and
backwards in time to re-experience personal past events, or what
is referred to as episodic memory (Tulving, 1983, 2005). The ability
to mentally travel forward in time has been referred to as: episodic
future thinking (Atance and O’Neill, 2001), prospection (Buckner
and Carroll, 2007; Gilbert andWilson, 2007), simulation (Tulving,
1985; Schacter andAddis,2007;Atance,2008; Schacter et al., 2008),
projection (Okuda et al., 2003), mental time travel into the future
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997; Klein, 2013), episodic simulation
of future events (Schacter et al., 2007), episodic foresight (Sudden-
dorf, 2010) and, more recently, future-oriented cognition (Osvath
and Martin-Ordas, in press). Although these different terms refer
to different degrees or types of future cognition, they all share
the idea that future thinking entails imagining a personal future
event. In this article we use the term episodic foresight to describe
this particular ability.
The adaptive function of episodic memory is suggested to lie
not only in record-keeping of the past, but in what it can offer to
present and future ﬁtness (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007;
Dudai and Carruthers, 2005; Tulving, 2005; Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Klein, 2013). For example, when I try to
imaginemynext job interview, Imight retrievememories of previ-
ous job interviews so I can avoid certain (embarrassing) situations.
In fact, from an evolutionary perspective, imagining and planning
for one’s personal future based on memories of past events, and
planning for future events that do not depend on current needs is
argued to provide an important selective advantage (Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007; Klein, 2013).
Research in the past few years has shown that episodic mem-
ory and episodic foresight share numerous cognitive and neural
resources (e.g., Williams et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2002; Okuda
et al., 2003; Tulving, 2005; Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007;
Szpunar et al., 2007). Importantly, however, both theory and data
about the important role of semanticmemory in episodic foresight
have also appeared (e.g., Irish and Piguet, 2013), with some stud-
ies showing that semanticmemorymight be sufﬁcient for episodic
foresight (Klein et al., 2002). For example, a group of patients with
episodic amnesia, but normal semantic knowledge, were able to
succeed in a future decision-making (e.g., delay discounting) task
even though they could not imagine themselves in future events
(Kwan et al., 2013).
The extent to which both semantic and episodic memory
may be implicated in episodic foresight is interesting from a
developmental perspective given that a well-accepted (but by no
means uncontroversial) argument is that children develop seman-
ticmemory prior to episodicmemory (e.g.,Wheeler et al., 1997). If
so, then children’s performance on tasks of episodic foresight may
have important implications about the respective roles of episodic
and semantic memory. For example, a 3-year-old who is unable to
think about the future could conceivably be seen as having a lim-
itation in episodic memory, rather than semantic memory, since
the latter could be argued to already be fairly well-developed. In
contrast, if a 3-year-old performs well on a task of episodic fore-
sight, then it is arguable that semantic memory is sufﬁcient to
succeed. As we will discuss shortly, research (including develop-
mental) has shown an important link between episodic memory
and episodic foresight. However, the role of semantic memory has
received less attention yet, presumably, it, too, plays a signiﬁcant
role in thinking about the future.
The major goal of this paper is to analyze the relation between
semantic memory, episodic memory, and episodic foresight in the
context of developmental research.We ﬁrst lay the groundwork for
an analysis about how these two types of memory may contribute
to episodic foresight in children by brieﬂy reviewing contrasting
theories about the distinctiveness of episodic and semantic mem-
ory in adults. We then provide an overview of the research on
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episodic foresight in young children, paying careful attention to
age differences on these tasks because these can inform us about
potential memory processes involved. An important point that
we then build upon is the idea that in, certain contexts, semantic
memory is an important driver of episodic foresight. With this
point in mind we re-visit tasks of episodic foresight in children
with the goal of determining the extent to which both semantic
and episodic memory are necessary correlates. We then conclude
by suggesting possible avenues of future research with children
that will further help to elucidate the relative roles of semantic and
episodic memory in episodic foresight.
SEMANTIC AND EPISODIC MEMORY
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Tulving (1972) introduced one of the most inﬂuential distinctions
in the study of memory: semantic memory and episodic mem-
ory. Semantic memory was originally deﬁned as our database of
knowledge about the world. In contrast, episodic memory was
considered“an information processing system that (a) receives and
stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and
about temporal–spatial relations among these events, (b) retains
various aspects of this information, and (c) upon instructions
transmits speciﬁc retained information to other systems, includ-
ing those responsible for translating this information into behavior
and conscious awareness” (Tulving, 1972, p. 385). Thus, when
we state that “winters in Canada are cold” we are drawing on
semantic memory; however, when we remember walking on the
snowy streets of Ottawa a couple of winters ago, we are drawing
on episodic memory.
Tulving (1983, 2005) gradually reﬁned the deﬁning features of
these memory systems. He argued that episodic memory makes
possible mental time travel through subjective time, from the
present to the past, thus allowing one to re-experience past events
(Tulving, 1983). Another critical addition to his original model
was that a certain form of consciousness – autonoetic (“self know-
ing”) awareness – was a necessary indicator of episodic memories.
Tulving (1983, 2005) deﬁned this type of consciousness as a type
of ﬁrst-person phenomenological experience, which is based on
previous experiences, is detached from current perceptions, and
provides its owner with the feeling that the experience belongs to
his/her temporal self. This is in contrast to the semantic system,
where knowledge about facts is not subjectively tied to past expe-
riences but simply involves awareness of familiarity of knowing:
i.e., noetic consciousness.
THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN SEMANTIC AND EPISODIC MEMORY
The distinction between episodic and semantic memory was a
central feature of Tulving’s original conceptualization with the
most convincing evidence for such a distinction coming from
neuropsychological studies (Kapur, 1999; Conway and Fthenaki,
2000; Wheeler and McMillan, 2001). For example, patients with
medial temporal lobe lesions have been shown to lose the abil-
ity to use episodic memory while retaining other classes of
memory, including semantic memory (Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997; Hirano and Noguchi, 1998; Gadian et al., 2000). Similarly,
patients with semantic dementia have severe semantic memory
loss, while their episodic memory is relatively spared (Snowden
et al., 1994; Graham et al., 2003; McKinnon et al., 2006). Thus,
dissociations between these two memory systems suggest their
independence.
However, evidence for a clear-cut division between these two
types of memories is somewhat contentious (Squire et al., 2004;
Tulving, 2005). This is reﬂected in the following example. When
I remember my last winter in Ottawa (e.g., my apartment, the
snow, wearing warm clothes, the Rideau canal being frozen), I am
retrieving an episodic memory; however, facts such as “winters in
Canada are usually associated with snow” reﬂect semantic knowl-
edge and provide the backdrop uponwhich the episodic details are
integrated. This example nicely illustrates that semantic memory
penetrates episodicmemory (Balota and Coane, 2008). Neuropsy-
chological research has also demonstrated such an interdependent
relation between episodic and semantic memories (see Greenberg
and Verfaellie, 2010, for a review).
Similarly, repetition of events across time tends to transform
episodic memories into semantic memories (e.g., memories from
my time living in Canada). Interestingly, this kind of memory
does not seem to have a speciﬁc temporal component, be asso-
ciated with any speciﬁc event, nor involve autonoetic conscious
experience (i.e., I might remember several events associated with
that period of my life). Thus, one might be tempted to not con-
sider them as reﬂecting episodic memory. Note, though, that these
memories can be rich in other contextual details. In fact, if I were
asked to remember and describe my apartment in Ottawa, I could
probably provide precise details about its location, the color of
the walls, or its spatial arrangement. Importantly, these features
are bound to the spatial context, in which they were experienced.
Such contextual binding is crucial for memories to be consid-
ered episodic (Chalfonte and Johnson, 1996; Eichenbaum, 1997;
Newcombe et al., 2007). Thus, the recollection of speciﬁc fea-
tures of those repeated events suggests that these memories have
not been decontextualized and, therefore, these memories can-
not be drawn exclusively from semantic memory. Memories like
these are not explicitly addressed in the classic episodic-semantic
model. However, they ﬁt with Neisser’s (1981) idea of merging of
memories for past events into one representative event, Barsalou’s
(1988) concept of summarized or extended events, or Conway’s
(2001) “general events” level of autobiographical knowledge and
thus provide an example of how episodic and semantic features
are intertwined.
Because of such arguments highlighting the overlap between
episodic and semantic memory, Tulving revisited his original
model and re-deﬁned the relation between these two forms of
memory. In his new (hierarchical) model (termed SPI-Serial
encoding, Parallel storage, and Independent retrieval), episodic
memory became a subsystem of semantic memory and was con-
sidered to be dependent upon the integrity of semantic knowledge
(Tulving,1995). That is, information canbe encoded into semantic
memory independently of episodic memory. However, informa-
tion can only be encoded into episodic memory through semantic
memory. Nonetheless, Tulving’s SPI model has been empirically
questioned (e.g., Squire and Zola, 1998; Graham et al., 2000).
For example, Squire and Zola have argued that the encoding and
retrieval of semantic memory depends on the acquisition of the
episode in which such information was experienced.
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These different strands of evidence highlight that the contents
of episodic memory invariably involve semantic representations
and that there is clear inter-dependency between these two sys-
tems. As such, it may follow that episodic future thoughts also
contain semantic elements. We explore this possibility next from
a developmental perspective.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE
THINKING/FUTURE-ORIENTED COGNITION
In this section we provide a brief review of the history of research
on episodic foresight in young children. We then shift to con-
sidering the research in this area that has shown a link between
children’s memory for the past and their thought about the
future.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON EPISODIC FORESIGHT
Although the study of children’s episodic foresight is relatively
new, the extent to which children think about the future has not
been completely overlooked by developmental psychologists. In
addition, the claim that thought about the future is based on our
memories of the past was also made by researchers prior to the
1990s (e.g., Harner, 1982; Nelson, 1989; Weist, 1989; Friedman,
1990). Some of the earliest research on children’s conception of
the future was conducted in the area of language, with a number
of researchers reporting that around 2 years of age children begin
to verbally reference both the past and the future (e.g., Sachs,
1983; Eisenberg, 1985; Nelson, 1989). Although children’s early
talk about the future appears to bebuilt upon theirmemories of the
past (e.g., Nelson, 1989), it is important to note that novel details
are also incorporated into these accounts thus supporting the claim
that factors other thanmemory play an important role (Atance and
Martin-Ordas, 2014; though such factors will not be the focus of
our paper). In what follows we outline work on episodic foresight
dividing it into the following two general categories: (1) verbal
tasks, and (2) non-verbal tasks.
Verbal tasks
A number of researchers have studied children’s episodic fore-
sight by simply asking them to talk about the future. For example,
Hudson et al. (1995) asked children between the ages of 3 and 5 to
report both plans and scripts for future events such as going to the
beach and going grocery-shopping. They found that whereas chil-
dren’s“script”reports did not improve signiﬁcantly between ages 3
and 5, their plans for these events did. Interestingly, Atance (2008)
has argued that reporting scripts may rely to a greater extent on
semantic memory, whereas reporting plans (with their inherent
focus on what “I”will do, rather than the generic “what happens”)
relies more heavily on the episodic system. Thus, conceivably, the
younger children whose episodic memory is not as well developed
as the older children may have struggled with the “plan” condition
but performed relatively well (i.e., no differently than the older
children) in the script condition because they, too, were able to
rely on their semantic memory.
Another verbal approach has simply been to ask children to
report what they will do “tomorrow.” In doing so, Busby and
Suddendorf (2005) and Suddendorf (2010) found that 4- and 5-
year-olds tended to report future events that their parents deemed
“accurate,” whereas 3-year-olds tended not to. Interestingly, 3-
year-olds did not seem to be limited by their verbal ability but,
rather, by their inability to predict an event that might plausibly
occur in their personal futures. Of course, a notmutually exclusive
possibility is that older children succeeded by retrieving a speciﬁc
past episode and merely projecting it into the future (as opposed
to thinking about the future, per se). The fact that parents were
asked to verify the accuracy of children’s reports reduces – but
does not eliminate – this possibility. Nonetheless, we return to this
study later in the paper because its ﬁndings have implications for
the relative roles that semantic and episodic processes may play in
children’s ability to talk about the future.
In contrast to the signiﬁcant age differences detected between
3 and 5 using the “tomorrow” method, more recent studies have
found that 3-year-olds are more skilled at talking about future
events than was reported by Busby and Suddendorf (2005) and
Suddendorf (2010). For example, Quon and Atance (2010) asked
children to respond to questions about speciﬁc events that would
occur tomorrow (e.g., “What are you going to have for breakfast
tomorrow morning?” or “What are you going to do the next time
you go to the park?”). Overall, approximately 63% of 3-year-olds’
reports were deemed accurate by their parents (vs. approximately
30% in Busby and Suddendorf’s 2005, study). Although Quon
and Atance (2010) also found that performance improved with
age, children seemed to perform better when asked about a spe-
ciﬁc future event vs. the future more globally (e.g., “tomorrow”).
This ﬁnding further suggests that children have particular difﬁ-
culty generating a plausible event in response to a general temporal
cue like “tomorrow.” However, when asked about a more spe-
ciﬁc event (e.g., breakfast), generating the necessary information
appears to be easier. If this line of reasoning is correct, then
one hypothesis is that children should be able to describe events
even more accurately were the event in question generated for
them. And, indeed, ﬁndings by Hayne et al. (2011) support this
claim.
Rather than asking children, themselves, to generate future
events, Hayne et al. (2011) asked parents to produce one event
that would likely happen to them and their child later that day,
and a second event that they would likely experience the next day.
Children were then interviewed about the future events provided
by their parents. After the testing session, each parent was sent a
transcript of what his/her child had said about the future events
and asked to rate his/her child’s accuracy. Hayne et al. found that
both 3- and 5-year-olds provided information about the future
events and, interestingly, there was no age difference in accuracy
between these two age groups (though 5-year-olds provided more
information per event than 3-year-olds).
Non-verbal tasks
A number of researchers have also used methods that could be
considered more “non-verbal” to tap into children’s episodic fore-
sight. For example, Atance and Meltzoff (2005) showed 3-, 4-,
and 5-year-olds photographs that depicted such scenarios as walk-
ing beside a waterfall, walking through a desert, and hiking up a
mountain. Children were asked to pretend that they would visit
these locations and to select one of three items to bring with them.
The correct item (e.g., raincoat) could be used to address a future
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physiological state (e.g., getting wet), while the other two dis-
tracter items could not. Each of the three age groups chose the
correct items at a rate higher than would be expected by chance
(74, 91, 97, for the 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, respectively); though,
overall, 4- and 5-year-olds performed signiﬁcantly better than the
3-year-olds.
Using another type of “item-selection”task, Russell et al. (2010)
taught 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds to play a game in which the child
and the experimenter stood on either side of a table with a goal
at each end and a ball to blow into it. Materials for this game of
“blow football” included non-essential items that were themati-
cally related to the game (e.g., cardboard referee, team badge), as
well as one essential item: a straw with which to blow the football.
To play the game from the experimenter’s side (the “blue” side),
however, children needed a box to stand on. Children ﬁrst played
the game with the experimenter from the “red” side and were then
told that they would be returning the next day to play the game
from the blue side. Children were then asked to select two items
(from an array of six) that would be needed for “tomorrow.”Only
5-year-olds selected the correct item pair (box and straw) more
often than would be expected by chance.
Finally, Suddendorf and Busby (2005) and Suddendorf et al.
(2011) have speciﬁcally targeted the extent to which children’s cur-
rent actions/choices are driven by the anticipation of future events
or needs. In fact, Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) proposed one
of the most commonly used criteria of episodic foresight that
has been used by both developmental and comparative psychol-
ogists. They suggested that having the future in mind should, at
minimum, provide ﬂexibility to the owner of such a behavior. In
addition, one should rely on a single unique experience (i.e., one
trial experience) and there should not be any cue/stimuli in the
present environment that could trigger such a response.
Based on these criteria, Suddendorf and Busby (2005), Sud-
dendorf et al. (2011), and Redshaw and Suddendorf (2013) have
developed tasks in which children are presented with a “problem”
in one room (e.g., a box with no key to open it) and then experi-
ence a brief delay (e.g., 15 min) in another room. After this brief
delay, children are told that they will return to the ﬁrst room and
are presented with several options; one of which (i.e., a key) can
be used to open the box and retrieve a reward (e.g., a sticker).
This experiment fulﬁlls at least two of Suddendorf and Corballis’
(2007) criteria because children’s performance is based on a single
unique experience and, at the time they are asked tomake a choice,
there is no (visible) task that can trigger the selection of the tool.
In these studies, 3-year-olds tend not to select the correct item at
a rate higher than chance, whereas 4-year-olds do. However, if 3-
year-olds are tested with no delay between the presentation of the
problem and the opportunity to select an item (with their back
turned to the problem so that they cannot see it), their perfor-
mance is signiﬁcantly above chance (e.g., Suddendorf et al., 2011).
Although we will return to this issue later in the paper, the need for
children to remember past information (e.g., shape of a keyhole)
is a necessary requirement for task success.
In sum, both verbal and non-verbal measures of episodic fore-
sight tend to show age-related changes between ages 3 and 5.
However, it is important to note that there are exceptions to this
general pattern. For example, Hayne et al. (2011) did not ﬁnd age
differences and Russell et al. (2010) found that only 5-year-olds
succeeded on their task. These age differences are consistent with
the idea that the extent to which memory (episodic or semantic)
is involved in task success may vary as a function of the speciﬁc
episodic foresight task.
In the next section, we discuss some of these developmental
studies in greater detail because they are relevant to the argument
that children’s memory for the past is related to their thought
about the future. More speciﬁcally, if semantic and/or episodic
memory are indeed required for children’s episodic foresight, then
the extent towhich children remember thepast shouldbe related to
their capacity to think about the future. Detecting this relation thus
sets the stage for themore speciﬁc argument that both episodic and
semantic memory are critical for children’s episodic foresight.
LINKS BETWEEN MEMORY FOR THE PAST AND THOUGHT ABOUT THE
FUTURE
Verbal tasks
In addition to asking children to report events that they would
do “tomorrow,” Busby and Suddendorf (2005) asked them to
report two things that had happened “yesterday.” As with chil-
dren’s responses to the“tomorrow”question, parents were asked to
state whether these responses were correct/incorrect. If memory is
indeed critical for episodic foresight, then children should perform
similarly on the yesterday and tomorrow questions. And, indeed,
a majority of 4- and 5-year-olds (56 and 75%, respectively) accu-
rately reported events from the past and the future, whereas only
a minority of 3-year-olds did (25%). In a subsequent study using
similar methods, Suddendorf (2010) again reported that children
who answered the “yesterday” question correctly were also likely
to do so for the “tomorrow” question. In addition, there was a
signiﬁcant correlation between the number of accurate responses
generated to the yesterday and tomorrow questions. Hayne et al.
(2011) also showed positive signiﬁcant correlations between the
amount of information provided about past and future events.
Non-verbal tasks
Several of the non-verbal tasks that we outlined earlier also speak
to the memory-foresight link. More speciﬁcally, recent studies
using variations of Suddendorf et al.’s (2011) paradigm indicate
that children’s failure to select the correct item (e.g., key) to solve
a past problem (e.g., locked box) is mostly driven by children’s
inability to remember the past problem (or features of it; e.g.,
Scarf et al., 2013; Atance and Sommerville, 2014). For example,
Atance and Sommerville (2014) gave children a series of tasks in
which they encountered a problem in one room (e.g., a glass of
juice glued to a tray with no straw with which to drink it) and
then, several minutes later in another room, were given various
items with which to solve the problem. One of these items (i.e.,
a straw) was the correct choice. In addition to asking children to
select an item to bring back with them to the ﬁrst room, children
were afterwards asked to state what had been on the table (the
location where the “problem” had been placed) in the ﬁrst room.
Atance and Sommerville (2014) found that when they controlled
for 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds’ responses to thismemory question, there
were no signiﬁcant age-related increases in children’s correct item
choices (e.g., selecting the straw in anticipation of drinking the
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juice) – the variable ostensibly measuring episodic foresight. This
suggests that task performance was primarily driven by children’s
memory for the past problem, and not necessarily by a “future
thinking” component. Moreover (and perhaps as expected), chil-
dren’smemory for the problem and their correct item choices were
signiﬁcantly related.
Taken together, these studies are consistent with the claim that
children’s ability to think about the future (or,“episodic foresight”)
is related to their memory for the past. However, what particular
aspect of the past and, hence, what form of memory can be argued
to be critical to task success? Although the assumption is that it is
episodic memory, to what extent might semantic memory also be
necessary? We next explore how episodic foresight may be driven
by both episodic and semantic memory.
THE ROLE OF EPISODIC MEMORY AND SEMANTIC MEMORY
IN EPISODIC FORESIGHT
IS EPISODIC MEMORY NECESSARY FOR EPISODIC FORESIGHT?
Atance andO’Neill (2001,2005) suggested thatTulving’s“episodic-
semantic” distinction could also be applied to future thinking.
Thus, episodic foresight (or, “episodic future thinking” as these
authors termed it)was described as the capacity tomentally project
oneself into the future to“pre-experience”a spatio-temporally spe-
ciﬁc event (e.g., imagining my next visit to Ottawa). In contrast,
semantic future thinking was originally conceived as the capacity
to think about facts and context-free general conceptual knowl-
edge (e.g., there is going to be an election next year; Atance and
O’Neill, 2001, 2005; Klein et al., 2002).
As mentioned earlier, the idea that episodic memory is crucial
for imagining future events is widespread in episodic foresight
research (Schacter and Addis, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis,
2007; Szpunar and McDermott, 2008). More speciﬁcally, episodic
memory is argued to allow for the extraction and combination of
stored information to create new events. In addition, authors have
argued that past and future events draw on similar information
and rely on common underlying processes (Schacter and Addis,
2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Klein, 2013). Thus, past
experiences are used to anticipate possible future events and this
is argued to have an important adaptive value. This hypothesis
has been conﬁrmed in a number of neuropsychological studies
in which patients with impaired episodic memory fail not only
at retrieving episodic memories but also at imagining personal
future events (Tulving, 1985; Hassabis et al., 2007; Addis et al.,
2009; Gamboz et al., 2010; Kwan et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011).
It is important to note, however, that one can retrieve episodic
information to anticipate a future situation without necessarily
mentally projecting the self into this situation (Pillemer, 2003;
Szpunar, 2010; Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press). For instance,
as Osvath andMartin-Ordas (in press) mention remembering the
last time I forgotmy keys and got locked out of my apartment does
not imply that every time I take my keys I do so because I project
myself into the future event of having to call the locksmith. Note
though that the behavioral outcome in both situations (i.e., imag-
ining the speciﬁc details of the future event vs. only anticipating
the negative consequences of forgetting my keys) is the same (i.e.,
I take my keys). This idea resembles the “mnemonic associative
theory” already suggested by Cheke and Clayton (2010), in which
it is argued that associate learning and future-oriented cognition
might sufﬁce for future thinking (i.e., “known future” as termed
by Klein, 2013).
So far we have described evidence supporting the idea that
episodic memories are the basis for episodic foresight. However,
recent research has brought into question the exclusive role of
episodic memory in episodic foresight. In the following section
we review evidence to this effect.
THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC MEMORY IN EPISODIC FORESIGHT
The contribution of semantic memory to episodic foresight has
received much less empirical attention than the link between
episodic memory and episodic foresight (but see; Szpunar, 2010;
D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012; Klein, 2013).
Most of the evidence for the importance of semantic memory
in episodic foresight has come from neuropsychological research
(e.g., Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012; Irish and Piguet,
2013). For example, Irish et al. (2012) explored the contribution
of semantic memory to episodic foresight in semantic demen-
tia patients (i.e., semantic memory impaired, episodic memory
spared) and Alzheimer’s disease patients (i.e., semantic memory
spared, episodic memory impaired). The results were striking:
WhereasAlzheimer’s patients showedproblems retrieving episodic
memories and imagining personal future events, semantic demen-
tia patients remembered past events but were impaired in episodic
foresight. Importantly these results suggest that semantic memory
may be necessary for the construction of future events. Similarly,
Maguire et al. (2010) have shown that patients with hippocampal
damage have an intact ability to construct imagined experiences
despite deﬁcits in the episodic memory system.
Taken together, these results pose difﬁculty for the idea that the
capacity for imagining new experiences is exclusively dependent
on episodic details from past events. With these ideas in mind,
we re-evaluate the work that has been done on children’s episodic
foresight to see if it can provide us with insights about how both
semantic and episodicmemories allow children to construct future
events.
CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL WORK ON
EPISODIC FORESIGHT
Verbal tasks
Recall that one difﬁculty that 3-year-olds appeared to have when
predicting events that would happen “tomorrow” was generating
events that their parents judged would actually happen the next
day. In other words, it was not the generation of an event in the
global sense that was difﬁcult but, rather, the generation of an
event that would actually involve/happen to them. One intriguing
interpretation of these ﬁndings is that, initially, younger children
generate “a future” based predominantly on semantic knowledge
about the world. More speciﬁcally, children may be more apt to
generate well-known“scripts”or“routines.”For example, children
may predict birthday parties, going to the restaurant, going to the
park, etc. without paying careful attention to whether this event
is likely to occur in their immediate future (i.e., known future). If
so, parents will report that this event is unlikely to occur the next
day. In contrast, older children may be better at thinking more
accurately about the speciﬁc events that they will engage in the
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next day. Thus, rather than generating a future, as might be the
case with younger children, they are better at generating their own
future (see Klein, 2013 for a similar argument). This might imply
that older children are relying on semantic memory (e.g., they can
apply script knowledge about the event) but also that they may
be able to imagine their own future and ﬁlter out, or “screen,”
those events that are not likely to occur to them the next day. It
is possible that this ﬁltering process is a function of the episodic
system. Indeed, Atance and O’Neill (2005) argue that one key
factor that differentiates episodic foresight from related processes
(e.g., imagination) is the notion of constraints. For example, if one
has a broken leg, it is possible to imagine the event of going skiing
(with this process likely drawing largely on semantic knowledge
about skiing) yet, one cannot realistically project into this event
because of the constraint of having a broken leg.
If our line of reasoning is correct, this would imply that provid-
ing younger children with the event in question (past or future)
would then allow them to elaborate upon it (but they would nev-
ertheless have difﬁculty generating it themselves). This argument
is consistent with Hayne et al. (2011) who found that both 3- and
5-year-olds could provide details about past and future events and,
importantly, that there were no age differences in this respect. This
is in contrast to Busby and Suddendorf’s (2005) study in which 4-
and 5-year-olds performed better than 3-year-olds. However, the
important difference between these two studies is that, in the latter,
children were asked to generate events they did yesterday or would
do tomorrow whereas, in the former, the experimenter provided
children (from parents’ accounts) with the events that had either
happened/would happen in their lives and asked them to elabo-
rate on them. In sum, whereas in Busby and Suddendorf children
needed to generate the events in question, in Hayne et al. children
were provided with a clear cue upon which they could elaborate
their reports. What this might imply is that the episodic informa-
tion is available to both younger and older children, but the way
in which this information is accessed differs across ages. Whereas
older children might be able to both generate their own cues and
use external cues, younger children might only be able to access
past memories when provided with external cues.
Conway (2005) has already introduced the distinction between
generative retrieval anddirect retrieval: whereas generative retrieval
requires elaborating upon one’s own cue to retrieve a memory
(e.g., when asked about your last conference, you need to elab-
orate the necessary cues to retrieve events associated with it), in
direct retrieval, the cue is provided by the context (e.g., a cer-
tain smell can bring to mind several memories associated with a
life period). Hayne et al.’s (2011) results are relevant to episodic
foresight because they suggest that providing children with spe-
ciﬁc cues will also facilitate the construction of a future event.
Accordingly, one would predict that the presence of cues in the
current context might facilitate episodic foresight in younger chil-
dren. However, only older children would be able to generate the
necessary cues to think about a future event. This is an issue that
requires additional empirical attention.
Non-verbal tasks
In this section, we distinguish “item-choice” tasks used by Atance
andMeltzoff (2005) and Russell et al. (2010), from those tasks that
have used a “two-rooms” methodology (e.g., Suddendorf et al.,
2011; Atance and Sommerville, 2014). Recall that Atance and
Meltzoff (2005) found that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were all sig-
niﬁcantly above chance in selecting a correct item to address a
potential future physiological state (e.g., Band-Aids in case they
get hurt). In addition to this more “non-verbal” item choice mea-
sure, children were also asked to explain why they selected the
item that they did (e.g., “How come you chose the raincoat?”).
Here, age differences were detected, with both 4- and 5-year-
olds providing signiﬁcantly more justiﬁcations that referenced a
future physiological state (e.g., “I might get wet”) than did 3-year-
olds. Clearly, having some knowledge (likely semantic in this case)
about the fact that raincoats are needed for rain or that Band-Aids
are needed when one gets hurt is necessary for task success. In
fact, this may be why 3-year-olds did so well on the item-choice
measure.
However, is this semantic knowledge sufﬁcient? The fact that
therewere nonetheless signiﬁcant age differences even on the item-
choice measure suggests that it was not. Could episodic memory
contributions be important as well? For example, is it possible that
accessing a past episode of having gottenwet because of not having
a raincoat increases children’s odds of selecting the correct item?
And,might episodicmemory (and a better sense of the“subjective”
self, in particular) explain why older children were much more
likely than younger children to actually link their choices to the
self by formulating such future-oriented justiﬁcations as “I might
get wet”?
Along the same lines, in Russell et al.’s (2010) study, only 5-
year-olds successfully chose the correct items (i.e., straw and box)
for a game of blow football “tomorrow.” In contrast, when faced
with a decision about a game of blow football “right now,” even
3- and 4-year-olds were signiﬁcantly above chance. This suggests
that their failure in the future/tomorrow condition cannot be
attributed to lacking the semantic knowledge necessary to solve
the task. Accordingly, it is difﬁcult to argue that the 5-year-olds
passed the future version of the task by simply drawing on seman-
ticmemory (otherwise, younger children should also have passed).
Rather, it is possible that the younger children correctly chose the
items in the present condition because they did not need to rely
on episodic memory. In contrast, thinking about what would be
needed in their own future (i.e., drawing on the episodic system)
may have overly taxed their planning skills. Interestingly, 4-year-
olds had less difﬁculty choosing the correct items that another
child might need in the future than they did choosing the items
that they, themselves, would need. This supports the claim that
imagining one’s own future might rely more heavily on episodic
processes than imagining someone else’s future. Such self-other
differences may in fact shed light on the extent to which semantic
and episodic memory processes are involved in episodic foresight.
More broadly, the role that such abilities as theory of mind play
in episodic foresight (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007) are
important to consider because, oftentimes, thinking about one’s
future self – a self that may have different desires, thoughts, etc. –
is similar to thinking about another person. In doing so, it may
also be possible to isolate the processes that are unique to adopting
one’s own future perspective (and, hence, “episodic foresight”) vs.
the perspective of another.
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We move next to tasks that have used two-room methodolo-
gies (e.g., Suddendorf et al., 2011; Atance and Sommerville, 2014)
and, more speciﬁcally, the role that both episodic and semantic
memory may play in task success. Recall that in one task used by
Atance and Sommerville (2014), children were presented with a
glass of juice glued to a tray (andno strawwithwhich to drink it) in
one room; several minutes later, in another room, they were given
various itemswithwhich to solve the problem. In this case, the cor-
rect choice was a straw. Arguably, at the most basic level, children
needed to remember that there was a glass of juice on the table,
for example. If children cannot remember this information, then
this precludes them from choosing the correct item with which
to solve the problem at a later time (and, hence, making the cor-
rect “future-oriented” choice). Interestingly, in Suddendorf et al.’s
(2011) control condition (i.e., nodelay, same/different spatial loca-
tion) both younger and older children chose the correct tool with
which to solve the problem (in this case, the correctly shaped
key to open a locked box). This implies that younger children’s
planning skills are already present. However, when children also
needed to rely on their memory of the past event, these planning
skills were insufﬁcient to succeed. This interpretation is consistent
with Hayne et al.’s (2011) claim that 3-year-olds form episodic
memories but these memories fade with time (see also Scarf et al.,
2013).
However, are there other aspects of the child’s past experience
that could also play a role in task success? Note that, at least in Sud-
dendorf et al.’s (2011) study, the “associative” semantic argument
(e.g., keys are used to open boxes) does not apply. This is because,
in this study, children were presented with several keys and they
could not merely succeed by making an association between “key”
and “box.” Therefore, it seems more plausible to argue that chil-
dren needed to remember speciﬁc information about which key
was needed (though it is important to note that retrieving infor-
mation about the key does not necessarily entail remembering the
event in which the key was ﬁrst encountered, Martin-Ordas et al.,
2012).
The idea that, in some tasks, it may be possible to isolate
a speciﬁc contribution of episodic memory is also nicely illus-
trated in a study by Metcalf and Atance (2011). These authors
used a “saving marbles” task in which 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were
shown two marble games in two different rooms. In one condi-
tion, a small/less-desirable marble run was in the ﬁrst room and a
large/more-desirable one was in the second. Children were given
a limited number of marbles and were told that they would spend
3 min in the ﬁrst room and then, afterwards, 3 min in the second
room. However, children were also familiarized with both marble
runs such that the experimenter showed them that when they put
a marble down the run they were unable to retrieve it again. Of
interest was whether children would save marbles for the second
room, rather than use them all up in the ﬁrst. Interestingly, chil-
dren saved very few marbles and performance did not differ as a
function of age.
However, children also received a (surprise) second trial of the
“marble game” to see if they could learn from their past experi-
ence (e.g., disappointment at having very few/no marbles left to
use in the large marble run). Interestingly, children saved signif-
icantly more marbles in this second trial and, again, there were
no age-related differences. An interesting way to interpret these
results is to argue that children’s “semantic” knowledge of mar-
ble runs, and the fact that marbles go down marble runs, likely
did not change during the course of the study. However, the one-
time event (i.e., trial 1) of not having marbles to use in the large
marble run then appeared to inﬂuence children’s saving behavior.
Thus, onemight conclude that episodic memory was contributing
to the increase in marble saving in this trial. The fact that trial
2 immediately followed trial 1, and that children may have been
quite disappointed at not having any (or few)marbles to use in the
large marble run may explain why the amount of marbles saved
increased across all three age groups, and not just for the older
children. Conversely, it is possible that because the task involved
more than one trial, children may have learned after the ﬁrst trial
that saving is a good strategy – such a rule being a function of
memory that is more semantic, rather than episodic, in nature.
When is it necessary, then, to remember emotional aspects of
the episode itself (e.g., disappointment at not having a straw to
drink the juice, put a marble in the marble run, etc.), and not just
the physical features of the problem (e.g., that the glass is stuck to
the tray)? In those instances in which the materials in question are
ones that are familiar to children (e.g., a glass of juice and a straw),
then surely knowledge about these materials and possible associ-
ations between them (e.g., straws are associated with glasses, are
used to drink, etc.) would certainly facilitate the activation of the
correct future-oriented response when the straw is seen amongst
a number of distracter items. However, this association would not
work when the future event involves the use of a straw but for
a different problem (e.g., to blow a ball). Thus, remembering a
situation in which I used a straw for a different purpose than to
drink might be necessary for successful performance in Russell
et al. (2010), for example. These experiences could be considered
more episodic in nature because they would likely constitute a
one-time event in the past that children draw upon to help their
future planning. This would be different from having the general
knowledge that “straws are for drinks.” Taking this a step further,
a child who has both well-developed “semantic” memories (e.g.,
straws are for drinks) and “episodic” memories (e.g., a personally
relevant past instance in which they used a straw for a different
purpose) would clearly be at an advantage in this task.
More speciﬁcally, to solve an item-choice task, children may
ﬁrst draw upon some sort of knowledge/semantic information
that forms the basis for guiding a future action. In some cases,
most notably when the problem in question is more associative
(e.g., straws go with juice), there may not be any other informa-
tion/memories that need to be drawn upon to succeed in selecting
the correct item. However, perhaps in contexts in which an asso-
ciative link is more difﬁcult to make, accessing a speciﬁc episode
in one’s past that is pertinent to the problem/situation in ques-
tion would also beneﬁt the child. Whereas the former would be
more objective/semantic knowledge, the latter would be more
subjective/episodic. This idea is intimately related to the ﬂexi-
bility criterion proposed by Suddendorf and Corballis (2007). We
suggest that the more novel the combination of past events used
to construct the future event, the more ﬂexible and creative (or
future-oriented) the thought of an event becomes (Osvath and
Martin-Ordas, in press).
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So far, we have been describing tasks of episodic foresight and
we have argued that both semantic and episodic memory likely
play a role in task success. We have also argued that, in some
instances, having the relevant semantic information may be sufﬁ-
cient to succeed on an episodic foresight/planning task. As such,
an important question to ask is what episodic memory adds to an
individual’s ability to mentally project into the future. Although
the notion of “ﬂexibility” is argued to be critical (Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007), empirically addressing this claim is challeng-
ing. We have also identiﬁed ways in which episodic memory may
facilitate children’s performance on a variety of episodic foresight
tasks. However, we discuss this particular issue in more detail
in this next section and also suggest some directions for future
research.
THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN EPISODIC FORESIGHT:
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There is no doubt that some form of memory is involved in the
developmental tasks that have been used to assess episodic fore-
sight. However, one of the limitations of these tasks is that they
were not designed to directly assess the roles of episodic and
semantic memory in children’s performance. Therefore, future
research should move beyond assessing correlations between chil-
dren’s memory for the past and thought about the future and
empirically address the extent to which episodic and semantic
memory contribute to task success. We touched on several ways to
do so throughout our paper, including examining potential self-
other differences in episodic foresight, as well as the idea of holding
either the semantic or episodic memory demands of a task con-
stant and then observe how this impacts children’s performance.
For example, we argued that inMetcalf andAtance’s (2011) saving
task, improvements on the second trial may have been due to chil-
dren’s ability to mentally re-experience the disappointment (i.e.,
episodic memory) of having few/no marbles to put into the large
marble run, and not due to any new semantic knowledge about
marble runs. Inwhat followswe further elaborate ondifferentways
to study how both semantic and episodic memory contribute to
episodic foresight.
GENERAL VS. UNIQUE EVENTS/GENERATIVE VS. DIRECT GENERATION
OF FUTURE EVENTS
Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) and Suddendorf et al. (2011)
have argued that an important criterion of episodic foresight is
that it be based on a single exposure to an event. Two impor-
tant issues can be raised with respect to this criterion. First,
most memory systems require repeated exposure to a stimulus
for it to be retained (Morris, 2001). Moreover, certain condi-
tioning procedures have demonstrated that single trial exposure
does not necessarily rule out associative learning (e.g., Garcia and
Koelling, 1966). Second, we have already mentioned that some of
our memories do not necessarily involve unique events (e.g., my
ﬁrst conference talk) but, rather, general events (e.g., memories
from the time I was doingmy Ph.D). Yet, the“single exposure” cri-
terion would necessarily preclude such general events from being
considered as critical for episodic foresight. As such, we argue
that an important direction for future research is to analyze the
roles of both unique and general events to episodic foresight. One
way to do so is by asking parents to report general (e.g., swim-
ming lessons) and unique (e.g., going to Disney World) events
from their child’s past. Then, children could be asked to imagine
and describe either a general future event (e.g., talk about future
tennis lessons) based on a general memory (e.g., past swimming
lessons) or to describe a unique future event (e.g., future trip to
Disneyland) that is related to a unique past event (e.g., past trip
to Disney World). Because memories for general events are more
semantic than episodic in nature, one would expect younger chil-
dren to succeed at constructing and talking about general future
events (e.g., tennis lessons) that are based on general past events
(e.g., swimming lessons). In contrast, younger children would be
expected to havemore difﬁculty constructing unique future events
(e.g., trip to Disneyland) when they can only rely on unique past
events (e.g., past trip to Disney World). In contrast, older chil-
dren should be able to use information from both general and
unique events. Therefore, one would expect them to success-
fully describe future events based on both general and unique
events.
Earlier in our paper, we argued that the studies by Hayne et al.
(2011) and Busby and Suddendorf (2005) could be re-interpreted
along the lines of generative vs. direct retrieval (Conway, 2005).
Note, though, that these studies did not directly assess this issue
and, hence, more controlled experiments are needed. Therefore,
one could extend the line of research suggested above by ask-
ing children to use this information (e.g., semantic and episodic
memories) to create a speciﬁc future event (e.g., talk about your
swimming lesson tomorrow) or to imagine what they will do in
the future (e.g., what are you going to do tomorrow?). This would
allow us to directly test the idea of generative (i.e., elaborating
upon one’s own cue/event to think about a future event) vs. direct
(i.e., the speciﬁc cue/event is provided by the experimenter) gen-
eration of future events. If providing children with a more speciﬁc
cue helps them to more accurately describe a future event, then
we would expect older children to perform better than younger
children when no speciﬁc cue about a future event is provided.
This is because while younger children might be able to elaborate
upon an event that is provided to them (as in Hayne et al., 2011),
older children might be able to think about the events that could
happen to them even when they are asked to generate them on
their own (e.g., what are you going to do tomorrow?).
FLEXIBILITY
Imagining a future event in a constructive manner (i.e., being
able to interchange and combine features of past events in order
to imagine new ones) is arguably highly adaptive (Schacter and
Addis, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). It follows, then,
that ﬂexibility “frees” us from the current spatio-temporal context
and allows us to use past experience to imagine future situations
(e.g., solving problems) that we have not previously experienced.
However, semantic learning also provides us with ﬂexible behav-
iors (Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press). Indeed, we can apply
a skill (or objects) to new problems that are different from the
problems that served as the basis for training/learning (e.g., stim-
ulus generalization). For example, we can use a pen to write
with, but we can also use it as a blowpipe. We can do this solely
by having an understanding of the function and properties of
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pens. In other words, imagining how to use a pen as a blow-
pipe does not rest on our ability to remember a speciﬁc event in
which we needed a blowpipe. If existing semantic knowledge suf-
ﬁces for future-oriented decisions, when does the use of episodic
projection become necessary?
One possibility is that the more novel the combinations of past
events, the more creative a behavior/response becomes. Imagine
the following scenario: You know that tools are always kept in
the toolbox; however, in one past instance you placed the screw-
driver in a different location (e.g., inside a drawer). If you now
needed to ﬁnd the screwdriver, where would you search for it?
If relying solely on your semantic knowledge, you would go and
search inside the toolbox because that is where the screwdriver
usually is. But what would you do if you did not ﬁnd it there? In
this case, only the memory of the speciﬁc event in which you put
the screwdriver inside the drawer would allow you to successfully
search for it in the drawer (and not in the cupboard). We suggest
that developing experimental tasks that reﬂect this example could
provide insights about the speciﬁc contributions of episodic and
semantic memory in episodic foresight – especially in young chil-
dren. More speciﬁcally, we would predict that, in such scenarios,
children with a non-fully developed episodic system would have
difﬁculty. In contrast, older children would be able to retrieve the
unique past experience needed to successfully ﬁnd the tool.
In summary, we have described different experimental
approaches that have been used to study young children’s episodic
foresight. Developmental ﬁndings suggest that the capacity for
episodic foresight develops substantially between the ages of 3
and 5. We have pointed out that even though episodic memory
seems to be intimately related to episodic foresight, the role that
both semantic and episodic memory play in episodic foresight is
only now starting to be addressed. We also suggest that episodic
foresight might be possible without the need to recall episodic
memories and, based on this idea, we have proposed new avenues
of research that could provide us with important insights about
the ontogeny of episodic foresight.
REFERENCES
Addis, D. R., Sacchetti, D. C., Ally, B. A., Budson, A. E., and Schacter, D. L.
(2009). Episodic simulation of future events is impaired in mild Alzheimer’s
disease. Neuropsychologia 47, 2660–2671. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.
05.018
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., and Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the
past and imagining the future: common and distinct neural substrates dur-
ing event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45, 1363–1377. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016
Atance, C. M. (2008). “From the past into the future: the developmental origins and
trajectory of episodic future thinking,” in Handbook of Behavioral Neuroscience:
Episodic Memory Research, eds E. Dere, A. Easton, L. Nadel, and J. P. Huston
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Press), 99–114.
Atance, C. M., and Martin-Ordas, G. (2014). “Projecting the self into the
future,” in Wiley-Blackwell Handbook on the Development of Children’s Mem-
ory, eds P. J. Bauer and R. Fivush (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.),
645–664.
Atance, C. M., and Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). My future self: young children’s
ability to anticipate and explain future states. Cogn. Dev. 20, 341–361. doi:
10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.05.001
Atance, C. M., and O’Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends Cogn. Sci.
5, 533–539. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0
Atance, C. M., and O’Neill, D. K. (2005). The emergence of episodic future thinking
in humans. Learn. Motiv. 36, 126–144. doi: 10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.003
Atance, C. M., and Sommerville, J. A. (2014). Assessing the role of memory in
preschoolers’ performance on episodic foresight tasks. Memory 22, 118–128. doi:
10.1080/09658211.2013.820324
Balota, D. A., and Coane, J. H. (2008). “Semantic memory,” in Handbook of
Learning and Memory: A Comprehensive Reference, eds J. H. Byrne, H. Eichen-
baum, R. Menzel, H. L. Roediger III, and D. Sweatt (Amsterdam: Elsevier),
512–531.
Barsalou, L. W. (1988). “The content and organization of autobiographical memo-
ries,” in Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the
Study of Memory, eds U. Neisser and E. Winograd (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press), 193–243.
Buckner, R. L., and Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 11, 49–57. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004
Busby, J., and Suddendorf, T. (2005). Recalling yesterday and predicting tomorrow.
Cogn. Dev. 20, 362–372. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.05.002
Chalfonte, B. L., and Johnson,M. K. (1996). Feature memory and binding in young
and older adults. Mem. Cogn. 24, 403–416. doi: 10.3758/BF03200930
Cheke, L. G., and Clayton, N. S. (2010). Mental Time Travel in Animals. Wiley
Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn. Sci. 1, 915–930. doi: 10.1002/wcs.59
Conway, M. A. (2001). Sensory-perceptual episodic memory and its context: auto-
biographical memory. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Biol. Sci. 356, 1375–1384. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2001.0940
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. J. Mem. Lang. 52, 594–628. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005
Conway, M. A., and Fthenaki, A. (2000). “Disruption and loss of autobiographical
memory,” in Handbook of Neuropsychology: Memory and Its Disorders, 2nd Edn,
eds F. Boller and Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.), 281–312.
D’Argembeau, A., Renaud, O., and Van der Linden, M. (2011). Frequency, char-
acteristics, and functions of future-oriented thoughts in daily life. Appl. Cogn.
Psychol. 35, 96–103. doi: 10.1002/acp.1647
Dudai, Y., and Carruthers, M. (2005). The Janus face of Mnemosyne. Nature 434,
567. doi: 10.1038/434567a
Duval, C., Desgranges, B., De La Sayette, V., Belliard, S., Eustache, F., and
Piolino, P. (2012). What happens to personal identity when semantic knowl-
edge degrades? A study of the self and autobiographical memory in semantic
dementia. Neuropsychologia 50, 254–256. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.
11.019
Eichenbaum, H. (1997). How does the brain organize memories? Science 277, 330–
332. doi: 10.1126/science.277.5324.330
Eisenberg, A. R. (1985). Learning to describe past experience in conversation.
Discourse Process. 8, 177–204. doi: 10.1080/01638538509544613
Friedman, W. J. (1990). About Time: Inventing the Fourth Dimension. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Gadian, D. G., Aicardi, J., Watkins, K. E., Porter, D. A., Mishkin, M.,
and Vargha-Khadem, F. (2000). Developmental amnesia associated with
early hypoxic–ischaemic injury. Brain 123, 499–507. doi: 10.1093/brain/123.
3.499
Gamboz,N., DeVito, S., Bradimonte,M.A., Pappalardo, S. G., Galeone, F., Iavarone,
A., et al. (2010). Episodic future thinking in amnesic mild cognitive impair-
ment. Neuropsychologia 48, 2091–2097. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.
03.030
Garcia, J., and Koelling, R. A. (1966). Relation of cue to consequence in avoidance
learning. Psychonom. Sci. 4, 123–124. doi: 10.3758/BF03342209
Gilbert, D. T., andWilson, T.D. (2007). Prospection: experiencing the future. Science
317, 1351–1354. doi: 10.1126/science.1144161
Graham, K. S., Lee, A. C. H., Brett, M., and Patterson, K. (2003). The neural basis of
autobiographical and semantic memory: new evidence from three PET studies.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 3, 234–254. doi: 10.3758/CABN.3.3.234
Graham, K. S., Simons, J. S., Pratt, K. H., Patterson, K., and Hodges, J. R.
(2000). Insights from semantic dementia on the relationship between episodic
and semantic memory. Neuropsychologia 38, 313–324. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(99)00073-1
Greenberg, D. L., and Verfaellie, M. (2010). Interdependence of episodic and
semantic memory: evidence from neuropsychology. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc.
16, 748–753. doi: 10.1017/S1355617710000676
Harner, L. (1982), “Talking about the past and the future,” in The Developmen-
tal Psychology of Time, ed. W. J. Friedman (New York, NY: Academic Press),
141–170.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 732 | 9
Martin-Ordas et al. Role of episodic and semantic memory
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., and Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 104, 1726–1731. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610561104
Hayne, H., Gross, J., Mcnamee, S., Fitzgibbon, O., and Tustin, K. (2011). Episodic
memory and episodic foresight in 3-and 5-year-old children. Cogn. Dev. 26,
343–355. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.09.006
Hirano,M., andNoguchi,K. (1998). Dissociationbetween speciﬁc personal episodes
and other aspects of remote memory in a patient with hippocampal amnesia.
Percept. Mot. Skills 87, 99–107. doi: 10.2466/pms.1998.87.1.99
Hudson, J. A., Shapiro, L. R., and Sosa, B. B. (1995). Planning in the real world:
preschool children’s scripts and plans for familiar events. Child Dev. 66, 984–998.
doi: 10.2307/1131793
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., and Piguet, O. (2012). Considering the role of
semantic memory in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic dementia.
Brain 135, 2178–2191. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws119
Irish, M., and Piguet, O. (2013). The pivotal role of semantic memory in remem-
bering the past and imagining the future. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 7:27. doi:
10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00027
Kapur, N. (1999). Syndromes of retrograde amnesia: a conceptual and empir-
ical synthesis. Psychol. Bull. 125, 800–825. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.125.
6.800
Klein, S. B. (2013). Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to oper-
ations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem
of long-term memory. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 7:3. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2013.
00003
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., and Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal expe-
rience: The effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient’s ability
to remember the past and imagine the future. Soc. Cogn. 20, 353–379. doi:
10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125
Kwan, D., Carson, N., Addis, D. R., and Rosenbaum, R. S. (2010). Deﬁcits in past
remembering extend to future imagining in a case of developmental amnesia.
Neuropsychologia 48, 3179–3186. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.011
Kwan, D., Craver, C. F., Green, L., Myerson, J., and Rosembaum, R. S. (2013).
Dissociations in future thinking following hippocampal damage: evidence from
discounting and time perspective in episodic amnesia. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 142,
1355–1369. doi: 10.1037/a0034001
Maguire, E. A., Vargha-Khadem, F., and Hassabis, D. (2010). Imagining ﬁctitious
and future experiences: evidence from developmental amnesia. Neuropsychologia
48, 3187–3192. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.037
Martin-Ordas, G., Atance, C. M., and Louw, A. (2012). The role of episodic
and semantic memory in episodic foresight. Learn. Motiv. 43, 209–219. doi:
10.1016/j.lmot.2012.05.011
McKinnon, M. C., Black, S. E., Miller, B., Moscovitch, M., and
Levine, B. (2006). Autobiographical memory in semantic dementia: impli-
cations for theories of limbic-neocortical interaction in remote mem-
ory. Neuropsychologia 44, 2421–2429. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.
04.010
Metcalf, J. L., and Atance, C. M. (2011). Do preschoolers save to beneﬁt their future
selves? Cogn. Dev. 26, 371–382. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.09.003
Morris, R. G. M. (2001). Episodic-like memory in animals: psychological criteria,
neural mechanisms and the value of episodic-like tasks to investigate animal
models of neurodegenerative disease. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 356, 1453–1465.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2001.0945
Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean’s memory: a case study. Cognition 9, 1–22. doi:
10.1016/0010-0277(81)90011-1
Nelson, K. (1989). Narratives from the Crib. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Newcombe, N. S., Lloyd, M. E., and Ratliff, K. R. (2007). “Development of episodic
and autobiographicalmemory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective,” inAdvances
in Child Development and Behavior, Vol. 35, ed. R. V. Kail (San Diego, CA:
Elsevier), 37–85.
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., et al.
(2003). Thinking of the future and past: The roles of the frontal pole and the
medial temporal lobes. Neuroimage 19, 1369–1380. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)
00179-4
Osvath,M., andMartin-Ordas,G. (inpress). The futureof future-oriented cognition
in non-humans: theory, and the empirical case of the great apes. Philos. Trans. R.
Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
Pillemer, D. (2003). Directive functions of autobiographical memory: the guid-
ing power of speciﬁc episodes. Memory 11, 193–202. doi: 10.1080/74193
8208
Quon, E., and Atance, C. M. (2010). A comparison of preschoolers’ mem-
ory, knowledge, and anticipation of events. J. Cogn. Dev. 11, 37–60. doi:
10.1080/15248370903453576
Race, E., Keane, M. M., and Verfael-lie, M. (2011). Medial temporal lobe damage
causes deﬁcits in episodic memory and episodic memory and episodic future
thinking not attributable to deﬁcits in narrative construction. J. Neurosci. 31,
10262–10269. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1145-11.2011
Redshaw, J., and Suddendorf, T. (2013). Foresight beyond the very next event: four-
year-olds can link past and deferred future episodes. Front. Psychol. 4:404. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00404
Russell, J., Alexis, D., and Clayton, N. S. (2010). Episodic future thinking in
3–5 year-old children: the ability to thinking of what will be needed from a
different point of view. Cognition 114, 56–71. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.
08.013
Sachs, J. (1983). “Talking about the there and then: the emergence of displaced
reference in parent–child discourse,” in Children’s Language, ed. K. Nelson, Vol. 4
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 1–28.
Scarf, D., Gross, J., Colombo, M., and Hayne, H. (2013). To have and to hold:
episodic memory in 3- and 4-year-old children. Dev. Psychobiol. 55, 125–132.
doi: 10.1002/dev.21004
Schacter, D. L., and Addis, D. R. (2007). The ghosts of past and future. Nature
445:27. doi: 10.1038/445027a
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2007). The prospective brain:
remembering the past to imagine the future. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 657–661. doi:
10.1038/nrn2213
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation of future
events: concepts, data, and applications. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 39–60. doi:
10.1196/annals.1440.001
Snowden, J., Grifﬁths, H., and Neary, D. (1994). Semantic dementia: autobiograph-
ical contribution to preservation of meaning. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 11, 265–288.
doi: 10.1080/02643299408251976
Squire, L. R., and Zola, S. M. (1998). Episodic memory, semantic mem-
ory and amnesia. Hippocampus 8, 205–211. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1098-
1063(1998)8:3<205::AID-HIPO3>3.0.CO;2-I
Squire, L. R., Stark, C. E. L., and Clark, R. E. (2004). The medial temporal
lobe. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27, 279–306. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.
144130
Suddendorf, T. (2010). Linking yesterday and tomorrow: preschoolers’ ability
to report temporally displaced events. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 28, 461–498. doi:
10.1348/026151009X479169
Suddendorf, T., and Busby, J. (2005). Making decisions with the future in mind:
developmental and comparative identiﬁcationofmental time travel. Learn.Motiv.
36, 110–125. doi: 10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.010
Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M. C. (1997). Mental time travel and the evolu-
tion of the human mind. Genet. Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 123, 133–167. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2008.0301
Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: what is
mental time travel and is it unique to humans? Behav. Brain Sci. 30, 299–313. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X07001975
Suddendorf, T., Nielsen, M., and von Gehlen, R. (2011). Children’s capacity to
remember a novel problem and to secure its future solution. Dev. Sci. 14, 26–33.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467–7687.2010.00950
Szpunar, K. K. (2010). Episodic future thought: an emerging concept. Perspect.
Psychol. Sci. 5, 142–162. doi: 10.1177/1745691610362350
Szpunar, K. K., and McDermott, K. B. (2008). Episodic future thought and its rela-
tion to remembering: evidence from ratings of subjective experience. Conscious.
Cogn. 17, 330–334. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.006
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., and McDermott, K. B. (2007). Neural substrates
of envisioning the future. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 642–647. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0610082104
Tulving, E. (1972). “Episodic and semantic memory,” in Organization of Memory,
eds E. Tulving andW. Donaldson (NewYork, NY: Academic Press Inc.), 381–403.
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of Episodic Memory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Can. Psychol. 26, 1–12. doi:
10.1037/h0080017
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 732 | 10
Martin-Ordas et al. Role of episodic and semantic memory
Tulving, E. (1995). “Organization of memory: Quo Vadis?,” in The Cog-
nitive Neuroscience, ed. M. S. Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
839–847.
Tulving, E. (2005). “Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human?,” in The
Missing Link in Cognition, eds H. S Terrace and J. Metcalfe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 3–56.
Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D. G., Watkins, K. E., Connelly, A., Van Paess-
chen, W., and Mishkin, M. (1997). Differential effects of early hippocampal
pathology on episodic and semantic memory. Science 277, 376–380. doi:
10.1126/science.277.5324.376
Weist, R. M. (1989). “Time concepts in language and thought: ﬁlling the Piage-
tian void from two to ﬁve years,” in Time and Human Cognition: A Life-Span
Perspective, eds I. Levin and D. Zakay (Amsterdam: Elsevier), 63–118. doi:
10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61039-0
Wheeler, M. A., and McMillan, C. T. (2001). Focal retrograde amnesia and the
episodic-semantic distinction. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 1, 22–36. doi:
10.3758/CABN.1.1.22
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., and Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic
memory: the frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychol. Bull. 121, 331–
354. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.331
Williams, J. M. G., Ellis, N. C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., and MacLeod, A.
K. (1996). The speciﬁcity of autobiographical memory and imageability of the
future. Mem. Cogn. 24, 116–25. doi: 10.3758/BF03197278
Conflict of Interest Statement:The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 26 March 2014; accepted: 24 June 2014; published online: 08 July 2014.
Citation: Martin-Ordas G, Atance CM and Caza JS (2014) How do episodic and
semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children? Front. Psychol.
5:732. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00732
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Martin-Ordas, Atance and Caza. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 732 | 11
